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By 1980 economic historians seemed to have reached some de­
gree of consensus over many of the issues concerning British 
overseas investm ent before 1914 in general and the flotation of 
Latin American government bonds in particular. Research on 
the level of B ritish capital exports had tended to revise and re­
fine the figures ra th e r than  create controversies around them. 
It had also defined fairly clearly the periods in which invest­
m ent in government securities had reached a peak: the early 
1870s, the late 1880s and the decade preceding the F irst World 
War. The City of London was assum ed to have dom inated len­
ding to Latin American governments before 1914. It was par­
ticularly attractive as a source of capital once the defaulted 
debts of the post-independence period had been settled in the 
m id-nineteenth century because, of all the major European fi­
nancial centres, it possessed the most liberal regulations on 
capital movements. Before 1914 there was never any official 
supervision of the major issuing houses or the Stock Exchange 
and no attem pt to tie loans to purchases of B ritish goods (Born 
1983: 115-116).1
The principal debates about B ritish investm ent in Latin 
America revolved instead around the relationships between 
bankers, bondholders, and debtor governments, w ith a particu-
1 This changed w ith the  outbreak of war in 1914. Thereafter there  were long periods 
when issues of L atin  American government securities were regulated either formally 
or informally. Regulations were fully relaxed only for a  few m onths in 1924 and from 
early 1926 until mid-1929 (Atkin 1970: 325-334; Moggridge 1971: 115-129).
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lar concentration on certain central events in the histories of 
individual countries: the Grace Contract in Peru, the Baring 
Crisis in Argentina, the 1898 Funding Loan and la ter support 
for coffee valorisation in Brazil, the 1902 Anglo-German in ter­
vention in Venezuela. However, except for these issues the 
subject did not a ttrac t a great deal of excitement. M any eco­
nomic h istorians were content w ith a picture of B ritish lending 
to Latin American governments based on an am algam  of Jenks 
(1927), Feis (1930), Rippy (1959) and Stone (1968; 1977), w ith­
out considering in any great depth the problems w ith the evi­
dence which these historians had presented or indeed the res­
ervations they themselves had expressed about it. M any made 
the assum ption -  or ra th e r few explicitly questioned it -  th a t 
British investors normally purchased and held the bonds issued 
in London, and th a t their willingness to do so depended on dif­
ferentials in yields between foreign loans and domestic bonds 
and shares. H istorians were also generally content to stop in 
1914, presum ably in the belief th a t nothing of im portance had 
happened thereafter in the London m arket, and th a t the debts 
incurred before World W ar I had been quietly liquidated in the 
course of the tw entieth  century. There was a tacit under­
standing th a t w ith the outbreak of World W ar I the dominance 
of the City of London had ended and th a t thereafter New York 
had more or less monopolised Latin American government bor­
rowing. Very few questions were asked about the role played 
by London financiers in the 1920s.
Some of the research which appeared during the 1980s de­
m onstrated a need for a reappraisal of many of these assum p­
tions. As a resu lt there is now scope for a comprehensive re­
search project on the London capital m arket and Latin Ameri­
can public debt between 1860 and 1930, using business a r­
chives, private papers, and Latin American government publi­
cations as well as the financial press (the traditional source), 
and set w ithin the context both of revisionist w riting on British 
investm ent in general and of recent w riting on Latin American 
debt crises in the n ineteenth  and tw entieth  centuries (see es-
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pecially Fishlow 1985a; Stallings 1987; M arichal 1989). This 
chapter does not provide th is reassessm ent, but ra th e r it draws 
attention to three of the problems raised in the recent litera­
ture: estim ates of British investm ent in Latin American public 
debt, institu tional changes, and the motivations of investors. It 
does not consider other im portant issues in the recent litera­
tu re  such as the macroeconomic determ inants of capital flows 
and the significance of the major debt crises (1866, 1873, 1890, 
1914 and 1930). I t raises questions ra th e r than  providing an ­
swers. Readers may well criticise it as resem bling a research 
proposal ra th e r than  a finished paper.2 However, the aim is to 
provoke debate.
1. E s tim a te s  o f  B r itish  In v e s tm e n t in  L a tin  A m erica n  
G o v ern m en t B o n d s
The notorious history of the bonds issued by m any of the new 
republics a t the time of independence exemplifies m any of the 
problems involved in quantifying investm ent. The actual flow 
of resources to Latin America was very much less than  the nom­
inal value of the bonds, because they were sold a t a consider­
able discount, some of the proceeds were retained  to meet the 
early in terest paym ents, and the issuing houses extracted large 
commissions. The subsequent conversions and settlem ents, 
which frequently capitalised arrears of in terest, added to the 
total nominal debt w ithout providing new capital, except indi­
rectly in th a t continued service of the new bonds opened the 
way to fu rther issues (P latt 1983; P la tt 1984; B azant 1968; 
M athew 1970; Veliz 1977; M arichal 1989). Any estim ates of 
British investm ent in Latin American public debt in the mid­
nineteenth century which are based on adding together figures 
for new issues of bonds on the London capital m arket thus have 
serious lim itations. The most detailed estim ate, Irving Stone's,
2 I hasten  to add th a t it is not a research proposal.
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which offers a figure of £ 61.8 million for 1865, greatly overesti­
m ates the actual flow of capital to Latin America, since it takes 
no account of conversion operations, and to a lesser degree the 
extent of Latin  American liabilities to Britain, because Stone's 
sources do not identify foreign holdings of bonds issued in Lon­
don (Stone 1968: 319).3
U ntil 1980 there had been little real dispute about the scale 
of B ritain 's to tal capital exports in the late n ineteenth  century 
and their geographical distribution, even though economic h is­
torians had used several different methods to arrive a t them: 
estim ates of invisible earnings and financial flows in Britain 's 
balance of paym ents; the evidence of investm ent income from 
abroad contained in the Inland Revenue returns; and records of 
new capital issues on the Stock Exchange (Pollard 1985: 490- 
492). H erbert Feis (1930: 23) had suggested th a t to tal British 
investm ent in Latin America in 1913 (government bonds and 
company stocks and debentures) had reached £ 756.6 million, 
out of a global total of £ 3763.3 million.4 Later estim ates had 
tended to increase this. J. Fred Rippy (1959: 68), using the s ta ­
tistics published in the South American Journal, claimed th a t 
B ritish capital in Latin America a t the end of 1913 totalled 
£ 999.2 million, of which £ 316.4 million was in government 
bonds. Irving Stone (1968: 319) offered a figure of £ 445.5 mil­
lion for B ritish investm ent in Latin American government 
loans in 1913, of a total investm ent in the region of £ 1177.5 
million.5 However, in the mid-1980s Lance Davis and Robert A. 
H uttenback reworked the same sources for capital issues on 
the Stock Exchange and, by taking account of "partial" issues, 
arrived a t a much lower estim ate for new issues of government
3 Stone was careful, though, to m easure the outstanding principal ra th e r th an  total 
new issues. His figures for the B ritish holdings of the Brazilian government's foreign 
debt, for example, are very close to those calculated by M aria B arbara Levy from 
Brazilian sources, see Stone (1968: 319), and the  tables following Levy's chapter in 
th is volume.
4 Feis's figures were explicitly based on Sir George Paish 's pre-World W ar I estim ates, 
w ith some minor modifications which did not affect the figures for Latin  America.
5 Stone, in his textual comments, implied th a t this was an  upper-bound estim ate. Later 
critics have not always recognised his own reservations about the statistics.
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securities in London between 1865 and 1913. Of a total of 
£ 623.4 million for total capital calls for South America, gov­
ernm ent bonds accounted for no more than  £ 223.4 million 
(Davis and H uttenback 1986: 67).6
This process of quantification came under a series of attacks 
from D. C. M. P la tt (1980: 1-16), who argued th a t the global 
estim ates for B ritish portfolio investm ent in 1870 should be re­
vised downwards to about ha lf of the conventional figure of £ 1 
billion, partly  on the grounds th a t continental European inves­
tors had acquired m any of the bonds issued or quoted in Lon­
don. P latt's  concern here was principally w ith loans to continen­
tal Europe and the United States, but his strictures had impli­
cations for Latin American specialists in th a t he questioned 
the assum ption th a t B ritish investors had purchased even the 
greater part of bonds issued in London, and he also included a 
few Latin American cases among the examples he quoted in 
support of his argum ent.
P la tt then  began to focus his investigations on the period 
between 1870 and World W ar I. In 1986 he published a vehe­
m ent critique of the Paish-Feis figures, which included some 
questioning of their assum ptions about Latin America, and in 
a few words he also dismissed Rippy's and Stone's estim ates as 
totally unreliable. P la tt claimed to have discovered evidence for 
substan tial European purchases of the Latin American govern­
m ent bonds issued in London. He also highlighted m any of the 
other difficulties which historians had quietly ignored: the prob­
lem of a ttribu ting  ownership of those government loans which 
had been issued jointly in several financial centres including 
London; the problem of quantifying flows of capital and distin­
guishing them  from the stock of British assets; and the problem
6 A "partial" issue was one which was made in other capital m arkets like Paris, Am­
sterdam , Berlin, or New York, sim ultaneously w ith London. The figures given by Da­
vis and H uttenback are not disaggregated in a form which Latinam ericanists can 
easily use, since they incorporate Mexico and Central America into figures for North 
America. Moreover, they  m ake a num ber of questionable judgm ents and factual 
errors about Latin  America, which reduces one's confidence in their procedures: for 
some of the  errors see Davis and Huttenback (1986: 28-29, 60, 105, 111-114, 167, 264, 
311, 361).
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of tak ing  account of am ortisation paym ents and the rep a tria ­
tion of securities to Latin America in arriving at a figure for 
British investm ent in Latin American government bonds (Platt 
1986: 17, 33-34, 37-40, 44-47, 91-92, 96, 100-105). P latt's  cri­
tiques have throw n estim ates of B ritish holdings of Latin 
American public debt before 1913 into turmoil, and underlined 
the need for a new and much more careful statistical recon­
struction. However, the debate has also highlighted several 
points about the London capital m arket which are of importance 
to h istorians of Latin American public debt.
W ithout doubt there is a major problem in calculating the fig­
ures for total new issues because of the need to find some way 
to tre a t bonds which were issued sim ultaneously in London and 
other financial centres. P la tt makes much of this point, but by 
choosing examples a t random  from the financial press in order 
to question the assum ptions of earlier writers. The resu lt is th a t 
his work underm ines confidence in estim ates like Stone's w ith­
out replacing them. In the absence of a methodical reading of 
the financial press in the half-century before World W ar I, it is 
difficult for us to judge the relative im portance of different E u­
ropean and N orth American capital m arkets for individual L at­
in American countries a t different times. The secondary lite ra­
tu re  on Latin American economic history is ra th e r unsatisfac­
tory in this respect because much of the evidence is contradic­
tory. An example cited by P la tt is the Mexican "imperial" loan 
of 1864 for £ 12,365,000, £ 8 million of which Jenks ascribes to 
London. In fact, according to P latt, who discovered the evidence 
in the Baring archives, the issue was a failure in London, and 
the City subscribed only about ha lf a million pounds (P latt 
1984: 58; Jenks 1927: 422). In other cases historians' assum p­
tions about the im portance of London for a particu lar issue dis­
agree w ith more detailed evidence in the contemporary press. 
Thomas Holloway (1975: 67-68) describes the well-known São 
Paulo coffee valorisation loan of 1908 of £ 15 million as being 
taken principally by J. Henry Schroder of London (£ 10 million, 
of which £ 2 million was subcontracted to the N ational City
The London C ap ita l M arket an d  L atin  A m erican Public D ebt 97
Bank of New York), together w ith Paris financiers (£ 5 million). 
However, the Economist, commenting on the loan a t the time, 
believed th a t of the £ 10 million handled by Schroder, only £ 5 
million was to be placed in London, w ith the rem ainder being 
subcontracted to financiers in New York (£ 2 million), Berlin 
(£ 2 million), and Antwerp (£ 1 million).7 These two examples 
illustrate the need for a reconsideration of the evidence on each 
loan issue, particularly  as they refer to two of the best-known. 
As things stand  a t the moment, the question of attributing  
ownership of partial issues is largely guesswork, bu t any 
simple listing of the new loans quoted on the Stock Exchange 
would clearly tend to overestim ate the in terest of the City of 
London, a t least for the period before 1914.
However, the total of new issues is only one guide to the level 
of B ritish investm ent in Latin American public debt. In effect 
historians need to differentiate more clearly among three sepa­
rate  calculations (in descending order of magnitude): the total 
value of Latin American government bonds issued in London 
over a set period; the outstanding principal of these loans at 
particular dates; and the total value of Latin American govern­
m ent bonds held by British subjects. I t would also be useful to 
calculate the actual flow of British capital to Latin America 
(and the re tu rn  flow of in terest and am ortisation is also impor­
ta n t for some debates). As already noted, the practice of issuing 
a loan sim ultaneously in two or more European financial cen­
tres m akes the calculation of total new issues problematic. To 
move from th is to the outstanding principal of these loans a t a 
particular date m eans taking into account conversion and 
am ortisation operations, details of which are not always clear.8
7 Economist (London, 12 December 1908), p. 1106.
8 For the late  n ineteen th  and early tw entieth  centuries it ought to be possible to obtain 
much more information about am ortisation (and interest) paym ents from Latin Ameri­
can official publications such as the  memorias of Finance M inisters. The problem, re­
flected in th is chapter, is th a t research on Latin American public debt in B ritain  has 
tended to see it as a sub-issue of the  problem of estim ating and explaining British 
overseas investm ents and financial flows in the century before World W ar I, and no 
historian  participating  in the  debate has really consulted Latin American sources. The 
papers in th is volume by Roberto Cortés Conde and M aria B arbara Levy illustrate  
the potential both of these sources and of computer spreadsheet analysis.
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To calculate from th is the value of Latin American government 
securities held by the B ritish creates a fu rther problem: th a t of 
establishing some idea (complete accuracy is impossible) of the 
changing ownership of the loans once they were floated.
Most government bonds were "bearer" bonds. Unlike compa­
ny stocks and debentures, there are no registers of bondholders 
from which historians m ight reconstruct patterns of ownership. 
It is clear, however, th a t quite considerable in ternational tran s­
fers of bonds did occur in the half-century before World W ar I. 
At present, the m ain sources of inform ation are inferences in 
the financial press, guesses by statisticians such as Sir George 
Paish before World W ar I and Lord Kindersley afterw ards, and 
occasional references which historians have discovered in m er­
chant bank archives, bu t as yet no historian has attem pted any 
kind of system atic traw l through these sources in order to accu­
m ulate evidence methodically. A few examples will illustrate  the 
extent of in ternational transfers and the problems of tracking 
them. By the second ha lf of the nineteenth century Mexicans 
had apparently  acquired substantial holdings of the country's 
external debt (Bazant 1968: 125; P la tt 1984: 56).9 In 1888-89 
G erm an banks undertook the conversion of the Argentine gov­
ernm ent debt, w ith m inority participation from Barings and 
M urrieta in London. Fairly soon after, for reasons which are 
not entirely clear (official discouragement of overseas loans or 
changes in Germ an investors' perceptions of A rgentina are two 
suggestions), the Germans appear to have sold a considerable 
quantity  of Argentine securities to B ritish investors (Cuccorese 
1977: 311; Kindleberger 1984: 258-259). The Peruvian bonds of 
1870 and 1872, which had initially attracted  substantial French 
in terest, had come to rest prim arily in B ritish hands by 1889 
when the Grace Contract settled the Lima government's out­
standing debt (P latt 1980: 6; Miller 1976: 82). Subsequently the 
stocks and bonds of the Peruvian Corporation, which the Lon­
don financial press continued to regard as a quasi-governmen-
9 See also the paper by Carlos M arichal in th is volume.
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ta l liability, a ttracted  investors from France, Germany, the 
N etherlands and the United S tates.10 A further, and probably 
completely insoluble, difficulty w ith in ternational transfers is 
th a t by the tim e of World W ar I some British owners of Latin 
American government bonds were depositing the ir holdings in 
banks abroad in order to avoid income tax in the U nited King­
dom.11
If such transfers create enormous problems for the pre-1914 
period, they make analysis of the inter-w ar years even more 
difficult. The Royal Institu te  of International Affairs published 
an authoritative survey of foreign investm ent in 1937 which 
noted on one page th a t Argentine indebtedness to B ritain  had 
increased since World W ar I, and on another th a t B ritish in ­
vestm ent in Argentina had tended to decline (RIIA 1937: 145, 
270-271). The am ortisation, conversion, and repatriation  of 
earlier debts probably diminished the sterling-denom inated 
liabilities of many Latin American governments to B ritain .12 
However, B ritish investors purchased substantial quantities of 
the dollar bonds issued in New York a t the tim es when official 
regulation had closed the London capital m arket to issues of 
sterling securities for Latin American governments (Atkin 
1970: 334; Moggridge 1971: 126; DAbernon Mission 1930: 
14-15; RIIA 1937: 164).
The assum ption, therefore, which historians, particularly 
non-specialists, can easily make -  th a t loans issued in sterling 
were largely purchased and held by B ritish investors, and 
those in dollars by US investors -  is difficult to sustain. The in­
ter-relationships among in ternational capital m arkets were 
quite intricate, even in the m id-nineteenth century, and they 
became yet more complicated thereafter. This also m akes the
10 Economist (London, 19 February 1910), p. 409; (27 August 1910), p. 443; H erbert 
Gibbs to H enry Hucks Gibbs, 26 Jan u ary  1894, Gibbs archive, file 11040/2, Guildhall 
Library, London.
11 Economist, (London, 17 Septem ber 1910), p. 552.
12 One reason why B ritish holdings of the  Brazilian federal government's debt rem ai­
ned relatively high is th a t am ortisation paym ents were suspended for long periods, 
from 1898 to 1910 and 1914 to 1927 (Fritsch 1988: 34).
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calculation of financial flows between B ritain  and Latin Ameri­
ca, as opposed to the estim ation of the stock of B ritish holdings 
of Latin American government debt, extremely difficult.
It is surprising th a t the debates over dependency and eco­
nomic im perialism  did not stim ulate greater efforts to calculate 
the direction and size of the net transfers between B ritain  and 
Latin America, bu t there seems to have been relatively little 
quantitative work on this question. It may be possible, however, 
to make some inferences from work on B ritish investm ent more 
generally about the direction of the flows on account of govern­
m ent debt, and their timing. In his reassessm ent of British 
overseas investm ent as a whole, Sidney Pollard (1985: 494) 
suggests th a t after 1870 the inflow of repaym ents to Britain 
exceeded the outflow of funds to the rem ainder of the world, 
except during the peak years of 1885-89 and 1905-13, a topic 
also studied by Fishlow (1985a: 390-391). This comment has a 
twofold implication for analysis of Latin American public debt. 
First, except in  the boom years when new capital did become 
available, the net transfer on account of government debt was 
normally from Latin America to Britain. A proper estim ate 
would have to take account of periods of default on in terest 
paym ents and the suspension of am ortisation, bu t since the sig­
nificant defaults decreased as certain borrowers became fa­
voured and renegotiation of debts became more common, the 
periodisation suggested by Pollard for British investm ent over­
all would probably fit the particular case of Latin American 
public debt. Second, if we accept th a t Stone's estim ates provide 
an approxim ation for the relative importance of different coun­
tries, if not for the absolute values of outstanding debt, it can 
be argued th a t once British investors began to receive repay­
ments of in terest and am ortisation on the poorer countries' 
debts they tended indirectly to recycle them  towards A rgentina 
and Brazil.13 This raises questions about institu tional changes
13 To pu t it slightly differently, if  one were to estim ate net transfers on account of gov­
ernm ent debt between B ritain  and the individual Latin American countries, one 
would expect the  flows to be more frequently in favour of A rgentina or Brazil than 
they would be for other countries.
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and investor perceptions in the London capital m arket, on 
which the recent research has uncovered some useful qualita­
tive evidence.
2. I n s t itu t io n a l C h an ges
One of the most significant contributions of Stanley Chapm an's 
work on m erchant banks has been to emphasise th a t issuing 
loans on behalf of Latin  American (or other) governments was 
only one aspect of the ir business, and generally not a particu­
larly im portant one. For long periods of the n ineteenth  century 
trading on the ir own account, together w ith the acceptance of 
bills of exchange, were the basic functions of the m erchant 
banks. As trade became more competitive and m argins decli­
ned in the second ha lf of the century some leading houses like 
Barings shifted more resources into loan issues. Nevertheless, 
the basis of the ir income continued to lie in their role as accept­
ing houses (Chapm an 1984: 32-33, 82-83).
There was a considerable institu tional turnover in m erchant 
banking. Rothschild and Barings, both of which had come to 
prominence during the Anglo-French wars, were exceptional in 
their longevity. Until late in the century the careers of the 
m erchant banks involved in the Latin American loan business, 
especially those acting for the sm aller countries, tended to be 
ephemeral. Several of the issuing houses which Jenks lists as 
leaders in government loans in the th ird  quarter of the century 
had disappeared shortly afterwards, even before the Baring 
Crisis h it the survivors (Jenks 1927: 421-424). While Barings, 
who had seriously mism anaged their acceptance and loan busi­
ness, were themselves rescued by a committee of bankers, the 
sm aller houses involved w ith Latin America suffered greatly in 
1890. The Anglo-Spanish house of M urrieta collapsed, while 
the loss of confidence crippled Morton Rose: both these houses 
had been heavily involved w ith Argentina. Antony Gibbs and
102 Rory M iller
Sons, whose in terests by then  lay prim arily in Chile, Mexico, 
and A rgentina, also appear to have sailed very close to the 
edge (Chapm an 1984: 80-81; 1985: 237). This was the last 
great shake-out of the m erchant banking sector. Henceforth 
Latin American issues in London were dominated by Roth­
schild and Baring and other in ternational houses like Morgan, 
Schroder, Speyer, Seligman, Kleinwort, and Lazard, which had 
begun to challenge the older firms from the 1870s.
For Latin  American governments the development of these 
firms, which possessed stronger resources, better reputations, 
and greater in ternational connexions than  those on whom they 
had depended in the m id-nineteenth century, had im portant 
benefits. The techniques used to issue loans also improved, p a r t­
ly as a resu lt of the 1890 crisis. Many of Barings' problems in 
Argentina, in Chapm an's view, had stem med from the ir selfish­
ness in attem pting to monopolise concessions (Chapm an 1984: 
77-78). They had therefore not formed syndicates to take up 
some of the ir new issues, a practice which had actually become 
well-established by the late 1880s as a consequence of pressure 
from US-connected houses like M organ.14 Nor had they sought 
underw riters for certain flotations, presum ably to save 
commissions. This left them  w ith large quantities of unsaleable 
Argentine securities on their books. After 1890 no m erchant 
bank, especially w ith an increasingly critical financial press 
anxious to examine all aspects of an issue, could have followed 
such a path. Thus both syndication and underw riting, as well 
as the practice of dividing loan issues among several European 
centres and New York, trends which were evident before the
14 Barings had actually led the £ 5.3 million refinancing loan to the  Argentine gov­
ernm ent in  1887 on their own, having shared the larger loan of 1886 w ith J. S. 
Morgan in London and three banks in Paris (Marichal 1989: 247). The chief cause of 
B arings' Argentine failures, however, was the  flotation of the  Buenos Aires W ater 
Supply and Drainage Company which they had purchased from the  government. It 
was the desire to keep th is to them selves which Chapm an really  criticises, for the 
issue failed. Ziegler (1988) was the first person to obtain access to Barings' private 
correspondence in the m onths preceding the crisis. While reproducing some telling 
comments about their ignorance of the  true  n a tu re  of their business in the  Plate, he 
made little  of it himself.
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crisis, had become standard  by World W ar I. These changes 
undoubtedly helped to spread the risks on individual issues 
and aided the ir flotation, thereby increasing the ability of m er­
chant banks to mobilise funds for Latin American governments.
Governments' negotiating positions also tended to improve as 
a consequence. Those not in default could negotiate term s with 
a num ber of banks in different m arkets. The beginnings of such 
a strategy can be seen in the 1880s, when the Argentine nation­
al government's decision to float loans in 1881 and 1884 using 
Paris banks as the "lead" institutions had a pronounced effect 
on Barings' eagerness to regain the ir position as Argentina's 
sole financial agents in Europe. Barings' refusal to take the 
1884 loan on the term s offered by President Roca had opened 
the way for J. S. Morgan and the Crédit Industriei (Ziegler 
1988: 236-237; Burk 1989: 47). Later in the decade both the 
Mexican and the Chilean governments negotiated loans through 
Berlin finance houses ra th e r than  with B ritish m erchant banks 
(Marichal 1989: 249).
This option became more pronounced during the lending 
boom which preceded World W ar I. Argentina, for example, de­
liberately attem pted to tap US resources in 1908 and was able 
subsequently to float substantial loans in 1909 and 1911 with 
only m inority participation from Britain (Burk 1989: 55-56; 
P la tt 1985: 83).15 Chile, too, was able to avoid the more conserv­
ative a ttitudes of Rothschild, its traditional bankers, both in 
1906, when it employed the Deutsche Bank to handle a loan, 
and in 1913-14, when it took its business to the London house 
of Morgan Grenfell (Ziegler 1988: 303; Monteon 1982: 112-113). 
Another good example is th a t of coffee valorisation, of which
15 W hether th is was wholly successful is doubtful. Ziegler claims th a t  Barings' infor­
mal pressure on other institutions in Paris and London helped to make the  1911 
loan a relative failure. Barings privately expressed the wish to dem onstrate to the 
Argentine government "the necessity of dealing w ith first-class banking houses" [i.e. 
themselves!] (Ziegler 1988: 310). On the other hand the Argentine desire to obtain 
money in New York also seems to have perm itted the London associates of J . P. 
Morgan, J . S. Morgan & Co (after 1909 Morgan Grenfell), to negotiate equality with 
Barings in  A rgentina's London issues following an acrimonious dispute in 1908-09 
(Burk 1989: 56-57).
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Rothschild, the Brazilian government's traditional financial 
advisers and agents, strongly disapproved. The sta te  of São 
Paulo, supported by a federal government guarantee, was able 
to obtain financial backing for coffee valorisation from other 
European bankers including J. Henry Schroder of London, al­
beit a t a price which m any have considered excessive because 
it surrendered its control over coffee stocks to a committee of 
bankers and m erchants (Holloway 1975: 56-61, 66-68). F u rth er­
more, the success of valorisation perm itted the sta te  to raise 
new loans through Schroder in 1913 (£ 7.5 million) and 1914 
(£ 4.2 million), in order to refinance its public debt (Holloway 
1975: 74). After World W ar I, when the opposition both of the 
US authorities (on an titru s t grounds) and of Rothschild re­
stricted Brazilian access to funds, the São Paulo Coffee Insti­
tu te  was still able to float a loan of £ 10 million through Lazard 
in London in 1926 (Fritsch 1988: 128).
Again, though, it m ust be em phasised th a t there has not 
been very much research on the extent to which competition 
among different capital m arkets and m erchant banks benefited 
governments. One can point to the trend, but it is much more 
difficult to evaluate its significance w ith any precision. It was 
certainly m itigated by the reluctance of certain banks to poach 
on each other's preserves, partly  because they depended on 
each other for successful syndication of loans. Thus Barings re ­
fused to take p a rt in business in Brazil and Chile w ithout the 
agreem ent of Rothschild, or in Mexico w ithout the involvement 
of Morgans. Barings also kept Speyer out of Argentina, when 
th a t house was expanding aggressively in the early 1900s, with 
a promise not to encroach on "their" territory  in Mexico and 
Cuba (Ziegler 1988: 303-304).
A fu rther resu lt of the greater stability of the m arket, the 
growing knowledge and confidence which B ritish investors 
showed about Latin America, and the wider availability of 
funds, was the increasing appearance of loans issued by state 
and municipal governments, as opposed to the national authori­
ties. There are few examples before the 1880s: M arichal lists
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four Argentine provincial loans, two for Buenos Aires and one 
each for E ntre Ríos and Santa Fe between 1870 and 1874. 
These am ounted to a nominal total of about £ 5.6 million 
(Marichal 1989: 243; Ferns 1961: 339). Ten A rgentine provin­
ces and five cities floated loans in Europe during the invest­
m ent boom of the late 1880s. Of the nominal total of £ 38.8 
million, London houses, headed by M urrieta and Morton Rose, 
took the lead in £ 24.4 million and shared it in a fu rther £ 4.3 
million (M arichal 1989: 247-248; Cuccorese 1977: 283-284). 
The only other examples of sta te  or municipal borrowing in 
London a t th is time were loans in 1888-89 for the state of São 
Paulo and the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Santos, the city of 
Montevideo, and, riding on the back of the successful conver­
sion of the Mexican national debt, the sta te  of San Luis Potosí 
and the m unicipal authorities of Mexico City. These came to a 
nominal total of £ 5.6 million (Marichal 1989: 247-289). The 
real boom in Latin American state  and municipal securities, 
however, occurred in the decade of cheap money before World 
W ar I when local authorities, especially in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico, benefited from the availability of funds and the 
reputation and creditworthiness of their national governments. 
Amongst the loans floated in London in 1910, for example, 
were issues for the province of Buenos Aires, the province of 
Corrientes, the city of Santos, the city of Pernambuco, and the 
city of Oaxaca.16 As w ith loans for national governments New 
York dominated this m arket in the 1920s, bu t London houses 
still led loans for the states of Minas Gerais, Paraná, Rio de 
Janeiro, and São Paulo, and the cities of N iterai and Santos 
(Marichal 1989: 251-253).
There are two other grey areas regarding Latin American 
public debt and the London capital m arket in the late nine­
teenth  and early tw entieth  centuries which require more a t­
tention. One is the converse of the point which has already been 
made about Latin Americans purchasing the ir own govern­
16 Reports of new issues in Economist (London, 15 Jan u ary  1910), p. 131; 1 October 
1910, p. 663; 9 April 1910, p. 787; 28 May 1910, p. 1196; 23 Ju ly  1910, p. 171.
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m ent's external bonds, nam ely British holdings of Latin  Ameri­
can in ternal debt. A priori reasoning would lead one to expect 
investors to have concentrated on the most credit-worthy coun­
tries and for this type of investm ent to have become more com­
mon in the years im mediately preceding World W ar I, bu t at 
present there is neither the quantitative nor qualitative evi­
dence to prove this. F rank  Colson reports examples of Brazilian 
in ternal loans floated in the Rio m arket but intended prim arily 
for sale abroad in the final years of the Em pire (Colson 1983: 
404-408). In  the 1890s, despite the depreciation of silver, large 
quantities of Mexican in ternal bonds also apparently  circulated 
in Europe (Bazant 1968: 147).17 J. H. Williams (1920: 152, 191) 
estim ated th a t 90 percent of the in ternal loans raised by the 
Argentine government between 1895 and 1900 were held 
abroad. The adherence of m any countries to the Gold S tandard  
ought to have increased the attractiveness of Latin American 
in ternal bonds in the decade before 1914, especially since they 
were frequently denom inated in sterling or gold. For example, 
the Economist's list of new issues in 1910 included an Argen­
tine in ternal loan of £ 1,209,600 a t 5 percent, the bonds being 
denom inated in gold pesos and w ith in terest payable in Lon­
don, Paris, and Berlin as well as Buenos Aires.18 However, this 
whole question of British investm ent in the in ternal debt of 
Latin American nations is yet another question which awaits 
more detailed research in the financial press, business a r­
chives, and probate records.
The second area which is almost totally obscure, largely be­
cause it was only rarely mentioned in the financial press and 
very few of those who have researched in m erchant bank a r­
chives have given it much attention, is the extent to which L at­
17 See also the  paper by Carlos M arichal in this volume.
18 Economist (London, 10 Septem ber 1910), p. 521. A further attraction  for investors 
was th a t  the loan could not be redeemed before 1915, thus guaranteeing, a t least for 
five years, the m aintenance of a relatively high in terest ra te  for investors in a coun­
try  w ith a high credit rating. Three m onths previously, the Economist had  criticised 
the  Argentine government's failure to convert m uch of its  old debt as in te rest ra tes 
fell. Economist (London, 16 Ju ly  1910), p. 109.
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in American governments were able to raise funds from Lon­
don m erchant banks against one- or two-year bills, in a tem ­
porary crisis, for example, or when the investm ent climate was 
not favourable for a new issue but likely to improve in the near 
future. Some examples do appear in the literature. The short­
term  loan which Barings provided for the Argentine govern­
m ent to m eet in terest paym ents on the public debt in 1876 may 
have taken this form (Ferns 1960: 380). Two years previously 
they had made Peru a sim ilar loan of £ 1 million (Ziegler 1988: 
230). A rgentina also began to obtain new advances from Ba­
rings in 1897, seven years before it raised its first publicly 
floated loan since the Baring crisis (Williams 1920: 152). The 
Argentine government apparently also made two issues of one- 
year 6 percent Treasury bills early in 1914 for a to tal of £ 13 
million (Albert 1988: 149). In Brazil one purpose of the São 
Paulo loan of 1908 was to pay the short-term  T reasury bonds 
which had been used to finance coffee valorisation and which 
London in terests reputedly held in large quan tities.19 Short­
term  funding of this kind rem ained a feature of valorisation in 
the 1920s. Lazard lent São Paulo £ 5 million for one year in 
1927 to finance coffee stocks. As conditions tightened, however, 
they found it impossible to rem ain in the game. São Paulo was 
able to raise a further short-term  loan of £ 2 million from 
Schroder, Rothschild and Baring in November 1929, but on 
condition th a t it abandoned the perm anent defence of coffee 
(Fritsch 1988: 130, 154-155).
These examples, however, probably represent little  more than  
the tip of the iceberg. H istorians need more inform ation about 
the scale, frequency, and implications of such arrangem ents 
w ith foreign m erchant banks. Did the occasional need for this 
type of finance, for example, provide a government w ith an in ­
centive to m aintain good relations w ith a particular house? Was 
it a m eans by which a more aggressive m erchant bank might
19 Economist (London, 12 December 1908), p. 1106. According to Thomas Holloway 
(1975) the initial finance for coffee valorisation came from £ 1 million of one-year 
T reasury bonds issued in August 1906 through the Diskonto Gesellschaft.
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break into a longstanding relationship between a government 
and an older house? Did the City of London make any use of 
arrangem ents like these during the 1920s when for long periods 
the public flotation of large loans on the Stock Exchange was 
either restricted  through formal regulations and informal advice 
or impossible because of m arket conditions? If it did so, was this 
a deliberate m eans of trying to m aintain influence w ith certain 
Latin American countries a t a time when New York had be­
come a more favourable place for the issue of long-term loans?
3. T h e M o tiv a tio n s  fo r  In v e stm e n t in  G o v ern m en t B on d s
Normally the motivations for B ritish investm ent overseas are 
discussed in term s of the higher re tu rns available a t times 
when opportunities for domestic investm ent were limited. D ur­
ing certain periods, however, purchasers took much less care in 
calculating the trade-off between risk  and return , and invest­
m ent became much more irrational. M.G. M ulhall, w riting in 
1877, shortly after a wave of Latin American defaults which cul­
m inated w ith Peru, noted th a t "most of the debts of insolvent 
republics in South America [were] only in teresting as documen­
tary  proof of the extent of hum an credulity" (Mulhall 1877: 
545). Charles Kindleberger (1984: 261) has also commented tha t 
"nineteenth-century investors seem to have been unusually 
naive in swallowing propaganda put out by venal journalists, 
in terested  bankers, and devious foreign offices, and especially 
in th inking th a t foreign bonds were more like bonds than  they 
were foreign, and hence were safe". He also notes th a t a dis­
tinction should be drawn between investing for speculative rea­
sons and for income (Kindleberger 1984: 260). The work of 
econometric historians like Ford (1971) or Edelstein (1982) has 
certainly shed considerable light on the reasons for the tim ing 
of investm ent booms, and relative yields on domestic and for­
eign bonds. Much less is known, however, about the identity of 
investors in Latin American government bonds and the ir moti­
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vations. Were they small investors, speculators, major finan­
ciers, financial trusts , or insurance companies, for example? 
However, the expectations and perceptions of specific groups of 
investors certainly affected Latin American governments' opera­
tions in the capital m arket, and the more quantitative analyses 
tend to gloss over them. To take the analysis further, it may be 
worth distinguishing three different m eans of obtaining retu rns 
from Latin American government bonds: the profits from pro­
motion, capital gains, and in terest payments.
The disparities between the money received by governments 
and the total am ounts subscribed by investors in the period of 
independence is well documented, the difference being pock­
eted by the promoters of the loans or returned  to investors in 
the form of a few in terest paym ents before default occurred. 
For m any republics (and many small investors) m atters did not 
improve until late in the century. An excellent description of 
the m eans by which unscrupulous loan contractors could hood­
wink the governments and the small investor appears in the 
report of the House of Commons Select Committee of 1875, 
which paid particu lar attention to the loans recently made to 
Santo Domingo, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Honduras, the com­
mittee noted, had incurred a nominal debt of £ 6 million, in 
re tu rn  for which it had acquired a now abandoned stretch  of 
railway 53 miles long, for which the contractors had been paid 
£ 689,745.20 O ther scandals from th is period include the loans 
for Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru.
A distinction, however, was beginning to appear between the 
sm aller countries, which had great difficulty in controlling both 
the ir own agents and the ir loan contractors, and the larger and 
more stable countries like Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, which 
were much better informed and possessed much better credit. 
In Carlos M arichal's words: "The London and Paris financiers 
exercised greater prudence with the ir larger, more stable cli­
ents, who provided them  w ith profits and rem ittances on a re-
20 "Report of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States", PP, 1875, XI, pp. VIII- 
XLVIII.
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guiar basis. In contrast, the weaker countries were fair game 
for all kinds of speculators, w hether established or newcomers, 
because the benefits to be reaped were expected to be extre­
mely short-lived" (Marichal 1989: 119). Barings' intervention in 
the m arket on behalf of A rgentina or Rothschilds' in favour of 
Brazil, while netting  the houses substantial profits and com­
missions, had as their purpose the m aintenance of the credit of 
these countries, as did the provision of short-term  loans to 
m eet in terest paym ents during a trade recession.
After the m ania of the 1870s, which culm inated in a wave of 
defaults, abuses on the scale uncovered by the 1875 Select 
Committee seem to have almost disappeared from the London 
m arket for government loans. This happened for various rea ­
sons. Once the  w eaker governments, who were less likely to be 
able to control the ir agents and also sustain  the revenues nee­
ded to service the loans, had ceased to pay in terest, they were 
unable to come to the m arket again. In some cases the ir ab­
sence lasted  m any years. The Peruvian governm ent did not 
float another loan in London until 1922. Moreover, the a tten ­
tion of the w heeler-dealers in London whose "expertise" lay in 
Latin America tu rned  to company promotion. While not denying 
the significance of speculation in government securities in hel­
ping to precipitate the Baring Crisis, the new feature of the 
boom of the 1880s lay in the flotation of large num bers of com­
panies to acquire and operate concessions in Latin  America, 
such as railways, public utilities and n itra te  oficinas. While 
m erchant banks like Barings, Rothschild, Antony Gibbs and 
Sons, and Glyn Mills were involved -  it is telling th a t the issue 
which lay a t the root of Barings' problems in A rgentina was a 
public u tility  concession -  the characteristic figures of the 
boom were perhaps men like Michael Grace and Thomas North, 
who, while they certainly had speculative in terests in arranging 
defaulted debts, were not involved in the promotion of new 
government loans, and much more concerned w ith the flotation 
of new companies.
The London C ap ita l M arke t and  L atin  A m erican Public D ebt 111
W ith no government supervision of the Stock Exchange, and 
no loan scandals to precipitate official enquiries after the mid- 
1870s, little  is known about the profits which m erchant banks, 
w hether leading or subsidiary members of syndicates, or u n ­
derw riters, received from their operations on behalf of Latin 
American governments la ter in the century. More research in 
m erchant bank archives, however, m ight find some evidence 
for some of the following prim a facie hypotheses. Over time the 
level of commissions and fees ought to have decreased, as com­
petition for governments' business grew. M erchant banks cer­
tainly increased the ir income from the government loan busi­
ness, bu t more perhaps as a resu lt of the greater volume of bor­
rowing, and the ir roles as purchasing and financial agents for 
governments. This argum ent is speculative, however, and it 
needs some research in private archives to ascertain its vali­
dity. There is also very little published inform ation on the re­
w ards which m erchant banks received from the conversion and 
funding operations which they carried out on behalf of Latin 
American governments. In the case of Brazil's well-known fun­
ding loan of 1898, the Economist, adm ittedly a partisan  observ­
er when it came to discussing foreign loans, commented: "W hat­
ever sacrifices these schemes inevitably involve upon the credi­
tors of foreign states, they provide handsome commissions for 
the loan agents and the syndicates which are always ready 
enough to undertake business of this kind.... The 'insiders' 
make large profits by so m anipulating the m arket th a t they 
are able to pass on securities to the public a t more or less inflat­
ed prices, so th a t they have everything to gain."21 However 
credible th is criticism may sound, there is a distinct lack of 
specific inform ation on this subject for this period.
For the bulk of investors, w hether institu tions or individ­
uals, Latin  American governments' bonds became much more 
clearly distinguishable a t the very end of the n ineteenth  cen­
tury  into those held prim arily for capital gains and speculative 
purposes, and those held for the reliable income they provided.
21 Economist (London, 4 June 1898), p. 837.
112 Rory M iller
Brazilian bonds had probably fallen into the la tte r category for 
much of the century, despite the disappointm ents suffered by 
investors in 1898. Argentine, Chilean, U ruguayan, and, late in 
the century, Mexican bonds gradually joined them. All loans in 
default, of course, fell into the former group, for the purpose of 
trading in them  was essentially to gamble on news reports or, 
more distantly, the real prospects of a settlem ent. Since bonds 
were to "bearer", it is almost impossible to identify those who 
bought and sold defaulted Latin American bonds for capital 
gain, as no lists of bondholders have come to light.22 The finan­
cial press also regarded some of the provincial loans as highly 
speculative, though w hether the private investor could distin­
guish as clearly as the Economist between Buenos Aires and 
Corrientes, for example, is less certain.23 To the extent th a t 
one can use the opinions of the financial press as an approxi­
mation for investor perceptions, however, the ability to differ­
entiate between speculative issues and those which would pro­
vide a reliable income on the basis of good security does appear 
to have become much more m arked by the time of the boom 
which preceded World W ar I. R ather than  worrying about the 
natu re  of the hypothecated property which would serve as se­
curity, the press began to look much more closely a t quantitative 
indicators like exports or government income and expenditure 
over a few years, and to analyse in greater detail Latin Ameri­
can countries' official publications.24 By then, too, the better
22 Very little  work has been done even on the shareholding registers which are avail­
able in order to identify investors in companies operating in Latin America, w ith the 
exception of Charles Jones on Argentina and U ruguay (Jones 1982). I confess th a t I 
have never tried  to work on the shareholding registers for the Peruvian Corpora­
tion, the  case I know best, to determ ine by inference who had been accum ulating Pe­
ruvian bonds and in w hat quantities in the run-up to the Grace Contract of 1889. It 
may also be possible to gain information about Grace's own stock m arket specula­
tions from the  archive of W. R. Grace and Co. in Columbia University, New York.
23 The Economist (London, 1 October 1910) commented on the Province of Corrientes 
6 percent Loan of 1910: "The issue does not appear to have been authorised by the 
Argentine Government, and the price a t which the  issuing house obtained the  bonds 
they now offer is not stated. The yield of a trifle over 6 per cent is none too high con­
sidering the risks."
24 This is a somewhat impressionistic comment based on my reading of the Economist's 
financial reporting.
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known countries' loans had become an attractive investm ent 
because of the ir yields and their lower dealing costs compared 
w ith company securities.25
The argum ent, then, is th a t a significant change occurred in 
the London capital m arket regarding Latin American govern­
m ent bonds between the time of the Select Committee Report of 
1875 and the first decade of the tw entieth  century, as investors 
acquired a much greater capacity to discrim inate among differ­
ent loan issues, holding them  for speculative and income pur­
poses accordingly. This favoured a handful of Latin  American 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, which 
found the cost of raising funds dim inishing as a result. It also 
had spinoffs both for the local authorities in those countries and 
for companies operating there. Moreover, both the national gov­
ernm ents and the m erchant banks concerned had great incen­
tives to avoid a complete default if the financial position dete­
riorated, as the arrangem ents made by A rgentina and Brazil in 
the 1890s, and the willingness of both these countries to receive 
B ritish financial missions in the early 1930s, illustrate. Those 
left out, and th is extended to companies operating in the less 
favoured countries as well as to the public authorities, found it 
much more difficult to gain access to London's financial re ­
sources on reasonable term s. As a spokesman for the troubled 
Chimbóte Syndicate complained to the Foreign Office in 1910: 
"Peruvian stocks were not favourably looked upon by the Lon­
don Financial Houses, and U nderwriters, unless such issue was 
in the form of Bonds, and in terest on same guaranteed by the 
Peruvian government 'backed' by a good and solid tax."26
25 Few have recognised th is point, but the  Economist believed th a t it made a difference 
of about 0.75 percent, namely th a t foreign government bonds yielding 4.75 percent 
were equivalent to a yield of about 5.5 percent in British-registered companies. 
Economist (London, 8 Jan u a ry  1910), p. 71.
26 Huxley to Norm an, 19 Septem ber 1910. PRO, FO 371/970/A34235.
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4. C o n c lu d in g  C om m en ts
This paper has tried  simply to identify some of the grey areas 
in our knowledge about the relationship between the London 
capital m arket and Latin American governments after the 
middle of the n ineteenth  century. It is w orth draw ing out four 
broad sets of points which arise from the discussion.
F irst, quantitative estim ates of Latin American govern­
m ents' foreign debts are in disarray. Even a t the most minor 
level evidence about the date, am ount, price, and in terest ra te  
of specific loans is frequently contradictory.27 Once problems 
like partia l issues, undersubscribed loans, and the distinction 
between to tal nominal assets and the flow of capital are taken 
into account, none of the major estim ates for B ritish invest­
m ent in the region appear particularly satisfactory or tru s t­
worthy, w hether those of Feis based on Paish's prew ar work, 
those of Rippy based on the statistics in the South American  
Journal, those of Stone based on Simon's database of new is­
sues, or the more recent upper and lower bound figures of Da­
vis and H uttenback. However, this does not imply th a t histo­
rians should go to the other extreme, a totally nihilistic ap­
proach to historical statistics. Rather, a need exists for new 
quantitative estim ates for B ritish investm ent in individual L at­
in American countries, using not only the traditional sources 
like the financial press and other specialist publications, but 
also the inform ation about specific transactions which should 
be available in recently released banking archives. Sources like 
Inland Revenue reports, probate records, and the archives of 
m erchants, insurance companies, and investm ent tru s ts  in B rit­
ain m ight also provide some data about the trading and owner­
ship of Latin American government bonds.
27 Compare, for example, Jenks' tabulation of Argentine loans issued in London be­
tween 1860 and 1875 w ith Ferns' discussion of them  or M arichal's la te r tabulation 
(Jenks 1927: 421-424; Ferns 1960: 339; M arichal 1989: 243). There are also discrep­
ancies between Kathleen Burk's discussion of Morgans' in terests in Argentine loans 
in the  1880s and the listing, based on press sources, which appears in Marichal 
(Burk 1989: 47-48; M arichal 1989: 247).
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Second, h istorians m ust distinguish among individual Latin 
American countries in evaluating the ir governments' relation­
ships w ith the London capital m arket.28 W ith the exception of 
Brazil, B ritish investors were not sufficiently sophisticated, 
due to lack of knowledge and information, to draw distinctions 
among different Latin American states until after the defaults 
which ended the m ania of the early 1870s. U ntil then  some 
gullible investors may have purchased Latin American govern­
m ent bonds in the hope of securing a higher yield than  they 
would obtain in consols or equities. The real income, though, 
accrued to the promoters and the speculators who traded the 
securities. Thereafter there was a divergence. Both the govern­
m ents of the leading countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) 
and the leading m erchant banks had an in terest in m aintaining 
a country's credit and avoiding default. Tem porary difficulties 
could be overcome by a suspension of am ortisation paym ents 
and the funding or reduction of in terest paym ents. This helped 
to sustain  prices and made the bonds more attractive to in­
vestors concerned w ith income ra th e r than  capital gains. It 
also had spinoffs for provincial and municipal governments in 
those countries, for companies operating there, and even for 
some Latin American entrepreneurs seeking additional finance, 
since it made the City of London much more accessible to them. 
However, the bonds of other countries -  the C entral American 
republics, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, and Peruvian 
Corporation stock, which the London capital m arket continued 
to regard as a quasi-governm ental obligation -  rem ained large­
ly speculative investm ents.
The attitudes of Latin American governments towards the 
London capital m arket probably also became more sophistica­
ted, as their credit improved and the competition from conti­
nental Europe and the U nited S tates for their business in­
creased. Some succeeded in largely ignoring London as the 
prim ary  source of funds, although the City's issuing houses 
frequently took up a m inority participation in their loans: Mex-
28 This is a central point of Carlos M arichal's excellent book, and one with which I to­
tally  concur (M arichal 1989: 9-10).
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ico is the best example. After World W ar I both A rgentina and 
Chile, which had possessed high reputations in London before 
1914, were able to tu rn  prim arily to New York, where in terest 
ra tes were lower and the m arket more open. B ritish investors, 
though, purchased dollar-denominated securities, especially for 
Argentina, in considerable quantities. Brazil rem ained more 
dependent on London, because the valorisation of coffee ran  
into an titru s t problems in the U nited States. Brazilian liabili­
ties to London also rem ained relatively high because am ortisa­
tion on the government debt was suspended between 1914 and 
1927. However, despite a decade of relative neglect, after the 
Wall S treet C rash A rgentina was able to tu rn  to the London 
m arket for lim ited am ounts of capital on the basis of its contin­
ued high reputation and its im portance to B ritain .29
Finally, as these examples imply, the changes in the relation­
ship between Latin American governments and the City cannot 
be considered in isolation from developments in other European 
financial centres and New York and the growth of domestic 
capital m arkets w ithin Latin America. One area of research 
which would be difficult, bu t which would shed considerable 
light on the history of in ternational finance, would be a more 
methodical attem pt to track the transfer of bonds across fron­
tiers, and in particular the extent to which B ritish investors 
held the in ternal loans of Latin American states and Latin 
American investors purchased their own countries' external 
bonds. A more careful study of the weekly m arket reports in 
the financial press, which frequently suggested the source of 
buying or selling pressure, would at least provide more evi­
dence on this topic than  exists a t the moment. It is an im por­
ta n t question, for the transfer of bonds to other countries might 
have considerable implications for policy-making. It has been 
claimed, after all, th a t one reason why Argentina, alone of the 
major Latin American countries, did not default on its external 
debt in the early 1930s was th a t Argentine citizens held so 
much of it (Diaz Alejandro 1984: 27).
29 These factors had im portant consequences for B ritish policy towards Argentina and 
Brazil in the  1930s, see Abreu (1984; 1985a).
